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COMMENTARY
Valentine Korah*
I am delighted to collaborate with Brooklyn Law School for
the first time. Thank you so much for inviting me to com-
ment.' Of course, I am delighted to collaborate with the Queen
Mary and Westfield College, but that comes more often to a
London Professor of law.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS THE ALLY OF COMPETrIVE
POLICY
I was particularly delighted to hear Charles Rule state
that intellectual property rights are the ally, not the enemy, of
competition.2 I share his view. If you perceive the transaction
ex ante, before investment has been made in developing the
technology, work or whatever, it is clear that Jefferson was
right, and we need protection from "free riders" as an incentive
to investment in creative effort. Few firms would consider
investment worthwhile unless each could appropriate the re-
sults. On the other hand, if the matter is perceived ex post,
after the investment that led to the right has been made, the
right can be seen only as a barrier to entry, since by that time
incentives to invest have become irrelevant.
On your side of the Atlantic, Tad Lipsky's famous speech
on the "Nine No-Nos" of patent licensing, given at the begin-
ning of the Reagan Administration, clearly recognized the need
for incentives.' Such notions are embodied in the theories of
* Barrister Emeritus Professor of Competition Law, University College Lon-
don; Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School, spring semesters 1991, 1992, 1993
and 1994
1. On the day of the Symposium there was little time for comments, so I
delivered a briefer version of the following notes.
2. Charles Rule, Speech at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Winter
Symposium (Nov. 1, 1993).
3. Abbott B. Lipsky, Special Considerations Concerning International Patent
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law and economics which have been commonly taught in North
America since the 1950s. In the United Kingdom, it arrived
more recently. On the continent of Europe, economics of law is
still seldom taught. Usually, it is after students have left law
school and are taught by their clients that they come to under-
stand business realities and the importance of law and eco-
nomics. So it is understandable, although unfortunate, that
European scholars and officials should be skeptical about the
desirability of intellectual property rights.
II. MULTIPLE AIMS OF ARTICLES 85 AND 864
The competition rules are seen in Europe as serving more
goals than just economic efficiency. We have already heard
about the importance of market integration, but there is also
an interest in freedom of access for competitors, whether or not
that increases competition or is an advantage to consumers.
For example, the Frieberg School of Economics, just after the
Second World War, had a horror of exclusive rights which were
perceived, ex post, as barring access to markets. This conflicted
with the German constitution, which guarantees citizens' ac-
cess to markets.' This is particularly important, since German
law and thinking have been very influential in the Competition
Department of the European Commission, DG IV, especially in
the 1960s and 1970s.
III. HOSTILITY IN THE 1970s
At the very beginning, in 1962, the European Commission
did issue a notice on exclusive patent licenses that was favor-
able to individual intellectual property rights.6 But the first
European Commission decisions on intellectual property licens-
ing from 1972 were hostile to many restrictions of conduct if
and Know-How Licensing and Joint Research and Development Activities; Current
Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing, Address at National Institute on
Critical Issues in International Antitrust and Unfair Competition (Nov. 5, 1981) in
50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515 (1982).
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, EC TREATY
arts. 85-86.
5. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 12 (F.R.G.).
6. See JAMES P. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C. 256
(1973).
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the licenses were important to the market-for example, exclu-
sive sales territories with ancillary export bans on other licens-
ees, restrictions on challenging the validity of the patent li-
censed, strong feedback clauses, and tie-ins.7 Throughout this
period from the early 1970s until 1984 when Dr. Johannes was
responsible for the department dealing with intellectual prop-
erty in DG IV, the Competition Department of the European
Commission, the attitude followed American thinking and was
hostile to intellectual property rights. However, Dr. Johannes
was succeeded by Signor Guttuso, who is more liberal and
understands the need to protect firms that invest from free
riders.
IV. CHANGING VIEWS IN THE COMMISSION
The Commission's exemption for patent licensing adopted
in 19848 was far more restrictive than that for know-how li-
censes was in 1989.9 Thought is now being given to amalgam-
ating them and making the new regulation wider still. For in-
stance, treating the black-listed clauses, which are currently
drafted to exclude the application of the group exemptions, as
bad in themselves has been considered, but no longer as pre-
venting the application of the group exemption to other claus-
es, such as the exclusive territory and associated export bans.
Clauses that are currently black-listed may even be made
subject to the opposition procedure. If they are, exemption
would be obtained under the regulation if the agreement be
notified and the Commission does not oppose the exemption
within six months.' ° If it will be necessary to enforce the
agreement, this provides a complete answer to a European
defense based on Article 85(2)," so it is much more helpful
than a comfort letter stating that an agreement merits exemp-
tion but that the file is being closed.
7. Davidson Rubber Co., 11 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) D52 (1972).
8. Commission Regulation 2349/84, 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15.
9. Commission Regulation 556/89, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1.
10. The procedure has been little used until now, largely because it is difficult
to avoid a black-listed clause, in which case, the opposition procedure does not
apply.
11. EC TREATY art. 85(2).
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V. CHANGING VIEWS IN THE COURT
It seems to me that the recent judgments of the Communi-
ty Court have also become far less hostile to intellectual prop-
erty rights. In the early cases, the Court was extremely scath-
ing about trademark rights. In Sirena v. Eda,2 for example,
the Advocate General said:
Originally, a trade-mark provided the consumer with some
guarantee of the quality of a product, but nowadays it is
tending more and more... to become nothing more than an
aid to advertising.
From the human point of view, the debt which society
owes to the 'inventor' of the name Trep good Morning' is
certainly not of the same nature, to say the least, as that
which humanity owes to the discoverer of penicillin.13
In the second Hag case,' Advocate General Jacobs quot-
ed these passages and commented that this was an invidious
comparison between a trivial mark and an important discov-
ery. He added that:
[Alt least in economic terms, and perhaps also "from the
human point of view," trade marks are no less important, and
no less deserving of protection, than any other from of intel-
lectual property. They are, in the words of [W.R. Cornish]
"nothing more nor less than the fundament of most market-
place competition" ....
... Whereas patents reward the creativity of the in-
ventor and thus stimulate scientific progress, trade marks
reward the manufacturer who consistently produces high-
quality goods and they thus stimulate economic progress.
Without trade mark protection there would be little incentive
for manufacturers to develop new products or to maintain the
quality of existing ones. Trade marks are able to achieve that
effect because they act as a guarantee, to the consumer, that
all goods bearing a particular mark have been produced by,
or under the control of, the same manufacturer and are
therefore likely to be of similar quality ....
12. Case 40/70, 1971 E.C.R. 69, 1971 C.M.L.R. 260.
13. Id. It is interesting to note that this is an unfortunate example as Sir
Alexander Flemming did not apply for a patent for the original formulation of
penicillin.
14. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, 3
C.M.L.R. 571 (1990).
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... A trade mark can only fulfill that role if it is exclu-
sive. Once the proprietor is forced to share the mark with a
competitor, he loses control over the goodwill associated with
the mark .... "
The Court followed Francis Jacobs and, after deciding to
reconsider its judgment in Hag I,1" said:
Trade mark rights are, it should be noted, an essential ele-
ment in the system of undistorted competition which the Trea-
ty seeks to establish and maintain. Under such a system, an
undertaking must be in a position to keep its customers by
virtue of the quality of its products and services, something
which is possible only if there are distinctive marks which
enable customers to identify those products and services. For
the trade mark to be able to fulfill this role, it must offer a
guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under
the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for
their quality.
17
This is a complete U-turn from the invidious comparison in
Sirena" and the much criticized judgment in Hag I." The
European Community Court has come closer to the economic
thinking in the United States.
The Court seems to be less hostile nowadays also towards
copyright. In Musik Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA, ° the Court
applied much the same rule as in Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV
and Petrus Stephanus Exler," but in Coditel I,2 it consid-
ered that the rules for the free movement of services did not
prevent the exclusive copyright licensee from restraining a
15. Id. at 3731-32.
16. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, 2 C.M.L.R. 127
(1974).
17. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, 3758,
3 C.M.L.R. 571 (1990) (emphasis added).
18. Case 40/70, 1971 E.C.R. 69, 1971 C.M.L.R. 260.
19. See Case 192/73, Van Zuylen v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, 2 C.M.L.R. 127
(1974).
20. Joined Cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 147, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 (1981).
21. Case 187/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981). Merck marks the
high point of hostility towards intellectual property rights. The Court gave no
reasons for its judgment; it said merely that Merck must take the consequences of
its decision to market the drug in Italy. This was a conclusion not a reason.
22. 1980 E.C.R. 881.
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cable television company from rediffusing a television program
in Belgium.
In Coditel II,' it went further and stated that the exclu-
sive territories licensed to different distributors did not in-
fringe upon Article 85(1), provided that excessive charges were
not possible.24 It extended these judgments in Warner Bros. v.
Christiensen' to the leasing of disks, although these were
clearly goods rather than services, and, as in the Coditel cas-
es,"6 it referred to the custom of the industry and need for an
adequate reward. I wonder whether the Merck27 judgment
would be followed these days. It is possible to distinguish it,
but not on any basicreasoning.
There has been much discussion of the Magill case.28 I
have no objection to the conclusion, only to the reasoning of the
Court of First Instance. In Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts,"
23. Case 262/81, Coditel v. Cine-Vog Films, 1982 E.C.R. 3381, 1 C.M.L.R. 49
(1983). I also mentioned the Maize Seed judgment, Case 258/78, Nungesser v.
Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2015, 1 C.M.L.R. 278 (1983), where the European Court
of Justice ruled that an open exclusive license of plant breeder's rights did not, in
itself, infringe Article 85(1). An open exclusive license is one in which the licensor
agrees not to license anyone else for the territory, nor to exploit the rights there
itself. A restriction on a licensee for another area selling within the territory pre-
vents the license from being open, and absolute territorial protection "manifestly"
goes beyond the protection that can be exempted under article 85(3). It is difficult
to reconcile the parts of the judgment on 85(1) and (3). I use words like "mani-
festly" when I cannot articulate a reason for an arbitrary decision. The judgment
Coditel II rules that even absolute territorial protection may not infringe article
85(1).
24. This is an impossible test for a national court to apply. Few films make a
profit, and it is the hope of a huge profit on the occasional success that motivates
investment in production. The successes are the by-product of the failures. Produc-
ers would not invest in the failures if they could tell in advance which they would
be. How can a court second guess how profitable successful films should be?
25. Case 158/86, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, 3 C.M.L.R. 684 (1990).
26. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
27. Case 187/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981).
28. The Magill case is a collective reference to three cases: Case T-69/89,
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance 1991);
Case T-70/89, British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First
Instance 1991); and Case T-76/89, Independent Television Publications Ltd. v.
Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance 1991). Various criticisms of the
Court's reasoning were spelled out by Ronald Myrick in a talk given at Fordham
Law School in April 1993. Ronald E. Myrick, Influences Affecting the Licensing of
Rights in a Unitary European Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 81 (1993).
29. Case 144/81, 1982 E.C.R. 2853, 2 C.M.L.R. 47 (1983).
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the Court stated that in the present state of European Commu-
nity law, before it has been harmonized, it is for national law
to define the extent of its intellectual property law, and it
ruled that a right to a design that had been found abroad,
rather than created, might justify a restraint on imports where
the right had not been exhausted although such rights were
unusual in that they were granted to those who had not fi-
nanced any investment.
Nevertheless, there may soon be some limitations to this
doctrine. In a somewhat unclear passage in Terrapin (Over-
seas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie," the Court suggested that a
national court might find the doctrine of confusion used in
German trademark law was unduly wide, and Advocate Gener-
al Jacobs made that point far more clearly in Hag II."' The
doctrine of exhaustion itself, as described by Judge Bellamy, 2
limits the scope of national intellectual property rights, save in
so far as justified by European Community law. Although the
Court insists that it does not undermine the existence of the
right but only its exercise, that distinction cannot be drawn by
logical analysis and gives the Community Court complete dis-
cretion, save at the extremes.
It seems to me that in Magill,3 the Court of First In-
stance should have stated that there are limits beyond which
national law cannot create intellectual property. As Hugh
Hansen 4 says, there was neither an original creation, nor
sweat of the brow to justify an exclusive right in listing. Unit-
ed Kingdom law no longer grants such a right, so Irish law is
now probably alone in doing so. I would love to publish a com-
pendium of three excellent books on European Economic Com-
munity competition written by Bellamy and Child," Nicholas
30. Case 119/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1039, 2 C.M.L.R. 482 (1976).
31. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, 3 C.M.L.R.
571 (1990).
32. Judge Christopher Bellamy spoke at the symposium in London in the fall,
but was unable to submit a paper for publication. David Keeling spoke in Judge
Bellamy's place in the spring symposium in New York. For the contents of the
Bellamy/Keeling speech, David Keeling, Intellectual Property Rights and the Free
Movement of Goods in the European Union, 20 BROOK. J. INTL L. 127 (1994).
33. See supra note 28.
34. Hugh Hansen, Remarks at the ESC conference on competition law held in
Brussels (Nov. 1993) (Mr. Hansen is a professor at Fordham Law School and did
not give a formal talk at the conference.)
35. BELLAMY AND CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (1993).
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Green36 and Barry Hawk." Can anyone believe that their re-
fusal to grant me a license would be abusive? Those authors
invested both skill and effort.
VI. THE EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 90 TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Nicholas Green's horror scenario concerns me greatly. I
cannot believe that intellectual property rights will be abused
merely because they may be abused." That goes far further
than the compulsory license in Magill39 where the Court of
First Instance accepted that it had in fact been abused. Indeed,
the television companies now publish combined listings and,
through a joint venture, have entered the market Magill TV
Guide Ltd. wanted to open. In Europe, there are many indus-
tries that are protected by national law, and the Community
Court may have been willing to save its citizens from the inef-
ficiency of many nationalized industries, but now that it is
being less hostile toward intellectual property rights, I cannot
believe that it would do the same to them.
I can see that on a literal reading of Article 90(1),4" the
holder of an intellectual property right is an undertaking to
whom the State has granted an exclusive right. So there is
some danger that Nicholas Green is right. Indeed, I raised the
same spectre at a conference 18 months ago.4 I was cheered
by the disbelief of an articulate audience. I was told that intel-
lectual property rights had gotten away. In cases of exhaus-
tion, the Court has frequently stated that the existence, as
opposed to the exercise, of the right is not subject to the appli-
cation of the Treaty.42
Thank you, Chairman.
36. NICHOLAS GREEN ET AL., THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SINGLE EURO-
PEAN MARKET (1991).
37. 2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1990).
38. EC TREATY; Case 9260/89, ERT, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, went that far under
Article 90 in relation to the exclusive right to televise programs.
39. See supra note 28.
40. ECTREATY art. 90(1).
41. This conference was organized by ESC in Cambridge in September 1992.
42. I do not think that is because Article 222 applies to intellectual property
rights and not to property in the public sector. Indeed, according to the gossip, the
original function of Article 222 was to enable national governments to nationalize
their industries. I think the distinction is based on policy.
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